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ABSTRACT
Risk as a Compensating Differential in a Hedonic Wage Equation
by
Cathryn J. Santoro
Dr. Thomas Carroll, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Economics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Risk could be considered both a disagreeable characteristic of employment (i.e. the 
risk of death, injury) or, as noted previously, a factor in the probability, or more 
importantly, the improbability of success (i.e. the greater the risk in success, the less 
stable future earnings and employment). Accordingly, the inclusion of future wage risk 
in a study of compensating wage differentials is a logical step and, thus, the focus of this 
study.
Drawing a corollary between the theoretical framework of compensating wage 
differentials and the theory of risk aversion, this paper seeks to measure whether or not 
wage risk has an effect on observed wage rates in a hedonic wage equation.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The theory of compensating differentials was conceived by Adam Smith in The 
Wealth o f Nations over 200 years ago. Despite the passage of time, the theory remains an 
established framework for the analysis of wage differentials in contemporary economic 
institutions today. In general, the theory holds that differences in pecuniary wages are 
required to compensate for the non-pecuniary advantages and disadvantages of different 
employments. Chief among these are differences among workers in levels of education 
and training and differences among jobs in terms of various noneconomic attributes, such 
as status, prestige, and the quality of working conditions.
Although singled out as the principal compensating wage differential in the human 
capital model, a learning requirement is not the only non-pecuniary characteristic of 
employment noted by Smith. Others include the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the 
employment, the constancy or inconstancy of employment, the degree of trust required, 
and the probability of success, this last being a variation on risk.
Risk could be considered both a disagreeable characteristic of employment (i.e. the 
risk of death, injury) or, as noted previously, a factor in the probability, or more 
importantly, the improbability of success (i.e. the greater the risk in success, the less 
stable future earnings and employment). Accordingly, the inclusion of future wage risk
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in a study of compensating wage differentials is a logical step and, thus, the focus of this 
study.
Drawing a corollary between the theoretical framework of compensating wage 
differentials and the theory of risk aversion, this paper seeks to measure whether or not 
wage risk has an effect on observed wage rates in a hedonic wage equation and is 
outlined as follows: Section Two serves to address the current literature that which 
focuses on the effects of earnings variation on individual wages. Section Three provides 
the core microeconomic theory, with a focus on both compensating wage differentials 
and risk theory so as to develop the empirical model, that which is illustrated and 
explained in Section Four. Section Five provides an analysis of the test results, including 
core tables and statistics; and Section Six concludes the study.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current literature specifically addressing the effects of earnings variation on 
individual earnings is small in comparison to the general subject matter of risk itself. 
Levhari and Weiss (1974) developed a framework to assess the effects of uncertainty as it 
pertains to human capital, specifically noting the significance of the correlation between 
human capital and earnings. Although not technically a paper on wage risk (defined as 
factors related to the uncertainty of future income, including expected length of 
employment, security of employment (the risk of being made unemployed), promotion 
prospects...) and its direct effects on individual earnings, this early research opened the 
door for future studies.
King (1974) was one of the first to introduce the wealth-risk corollary by studying the 
effects of wage risk and wealth on income within educational groups, specifically males 
between the ages of 35-44 with four years of college. Measuring risk as the standard 
deviation of income within occupations for specific classes of workers, King showed that 
the mean income of workers was higher in those occupations where workers faced more 
wage uncertainty.
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Dividing the sample group even further, Johnson (1977), measured the effects of 
wage risk on individual earnings within an occupation for individuals categorized by 
race, education and age. Using a mean-variance measurement, Johnson also showed that 
occupations with greater risk were found to pay higher mean wages. Johnson expanded 
upon previous research by drawing the effects of worker mobility (ability of willingness 
of a worker to change jobs) into the equation and concluding that workers facing more 
uncertainty have a greater degree of mobility and, in turn, receive lower compensation for 
earnings uncertainty. They show that workers may actually prefer a riskier situation if 
they have a sufficiently high degree of mobility.
Feinberg ( 1981) was one o f  the first to  use panel data to  consider the variation in  
income of an individual over time. Feinberg modified the risk measurement, using the 
residual of the equation instead of the previous measurements that which relied upon the 
more popular mean-variance approach. The use of the residual creates potential 
econometric issues, though, violating a major assumption of classic linear regression, that 
which requires that explanatory variables and the disturbance term are not correlated. 
Violation of this assumption results in coefficients that are both biased and inconsistent.
Despite the use of the residual as the source of measurement for risk, Feinberg’s 
findings supported previous studies with greater uncertainty leading to higher wages over 
time. Similar findings were also supported in a study by Leigh (1983), who also used the 
residual as the form of measurement, confirming yet again the positive relationship 
between wage risk and individual wages.
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Extending Johnson’s earlier concept of worker mobility on compensating wages for 
earnings risk, McGoldrick and Robst (1996) used simultaneous equations where wages 
and the degree of mobility were endogenous. Using panel data, the authors’ results 
supported the traditional job-shopping model and found that workers facing more 
uncertainty with respect to future wage growth had a greater degree of mobility and, in 
turn, received lower compensation for said uncertainty. McGoldrick further modified the 
residual form of measurement, with risk quantified as the standard deviation of the 
residual for each industry and occupation, respectively.
As a further refinement to previous studies that which use the residual as the source 
of measurement for risk, Hartog, Plug, Diaz Serrano and Vietra (2003) tested for the 
effect of earnings variation on individual earnings by using a measurement for not only 
risk but also skewness. Their hypothesis^ is that workers dislike risk (earnings variance) 
but like skewness (small probabilities of receiving very high earnings) and, thus, would 
expect a positive sign on risk and a negative sign on skewness. They argued that one 
could pull out the systematic risk in the error term by taking the antilog of the original 
error term, calculating risk and skewness thereafter with the unsystematic portion of 
earnings variability transferred back to the model.
Accordingly, the authors generated risk and skewness measures by first estimating an 
earnings equation, then taking the antilog of the error term, third calculating the second 
and third moments from the antliog, and finally re-running the earnings equation with the 
values for risk and skweness included. Although the authors were able to reject the null 
hypotheses that both risk and skewness did not positively affect an individual’s wage
' Their hypothesis remains in this study hut the measurement differs so as to avoid the econometric issues 
noted.
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earnings, one cannot rely on these estimates in the presence of a major violation that 
which was prompted by their use of the error term generated for the current year’s 
observations (previous studies risk was estimated from residual variation over time).
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Earnings differentials among workers can be analyzed on the basis of many different 
characteristics, such as occupation, industry, gender, or race. Occupational differentials 
are one of the most important, though, because they capture the influence of several of 
the principal determinants of earnings in the labor market, such as education and training 
requirements as well as noneconomic attributes including autonomy and flexibility and 
the quality of the working conditions. The theory of compensating wage differentials is 
devoted to the study of such differentials, a theory that which was conceived by Adam 
Smith in The Wealth o f Nations over 200 years ago and remains an established 
framework for the analysis of wage differentials in contemporary economic institutions 
today. To better understand the theory of compensating wage differentials, it is important 
to develop the foundation of wage determination, which begins with the core elements of 
the demand and supply of labor.
The demand for labor on the part of business firms is a derived demand -  derived 
from the demand for the good or service produced by the firm -  and arises only to the 
extent that labor is a necessary factor input in the production of said good or service. The 
labor demand curve represents the employer’s estimate of the appropriate rates of labor 
input in its production function so that the employee’s marginal contribution to revenue is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
equal to the marginal cost of hiring. The employee’s marginal contribution to revenue is 
given by the extra output he/she produces (the marginal product) times his/her market 
price, the marginal revenue product (MRP), and reflects non-pecuniary characteristics of 
human capital (proxied by education), experience (proxied by age) and unobserved 
characteristics, that which would include honesty and intelligence, to name but two.
MRP is downward sloping due to the diminishing marginal productivity of labor with 
firms hiring up to that point at which MRP==wage rate (w) with profits at a maximum, the 
goal of the firm in a perfectly competitive environment and other industry structures. In 
order to maximize profit it is important to seek out those workers who are likely to be the 
most productive (have the highest MRP) and adjust its use of labor and capital to achieve 
the lowest costs of production at the same time. Isoquants show those alternative 
combinations of capital and labor than can produce a given level of output while isocosts 
show all of the combinations of capital and labor that can be purchased for a fixed dollar 
expenditure, given the prices of the two inputs. The production duality of capital and 
labor imply that the same tangency identifies the lowest cost for a given rate of output, or 
the highest output for a given cost. The point at which the isocost line is tangent to the 
isoquant curve represents the optimal level of employment and gives the demand for 
labor.
The s upply o f  1 abor i s derived from t he i ndividual’s ( the “ worker”) w illingness t o 
trade time for income in order to maximize utility - a choice between labor and leisure. 
Quantity of hours supplied to the labor market is the result of the interaction between the 
labor/leisure choice (the demand for leisure v. the supply of labor) and the price of this
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leisure in terms of lost income. Leisure is desired for its own intrinsic qualities and 
income (received via labor) for the goods and services it can buy.
The choice between labor and leisure results in the indifference curve and measures 
the number of dollars that the individual psychologically feels that each hour of leisure is 
worth. Every point on the curve represents those combinations of income and leisure that 
yield exactly the same level of utility. The curve shifts out at higher levels of utility. To 
maximize utility, the appropriate decision rule is to keep on working additional hours as 
long as the wage earned exceeds the psychological valuation of that hour of leisure.
Since leisure is demanded (a normal good) -  one expects the curve to be downward 
sloping ( the higher the price o f t h e  good, ceterisparibus, the 1 ower the quantity of it 
demanded) with less leisure hours demanded when levels of income are higher. The 
curve is also convex to the origin -  only so many hours of leisure time are available so it 
is not a one-to-one tradeoff or similar exact ratio but rather a diminishing trade-off. This 
results in the diminishing marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and represents the slope of 
the indifference curve or the individual’s psychological value of time. The shape and 
degree of convexity to origin can be different depending upon an individual’s preference 
of income versus leisure.
The price of leisure (which is what is demanded) is equal to the wage rate per hour of 
work (the higher the wage, the higher the price of leisure) and gives rise to the budget 
constraint, which shows all the various combinations of income and hours of work that 
are available to an individual given the wage he or she can earn in the market. The 
budget constraint represents the value of this person’s time to the market with the slope 
of the budget constraint equal to the negative of the wage rate -  the amount of income
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lost for each extra hour of leisure. It is important to note that an individual’s budget is 
modified in the presence of nonlabor income and the individual’s resulting labor supply 
function now dependent upon both the real wage rate and on the amount of real nonlabor 
income present, the level of wealth.
It is at the intersection o f  the indifference c urve and the budget constraint that the 
person maximizes utility. Thus, the quantity of labor supplied is given by the condition 
that MRS=w and identifies the marginal hour worked. It is only when MRS=w or MRS 
<w that one will enter the labor market, as w now exceeds the individual’s reservation 
wage, or Wr (the amount of money that this person would have to be paid to be induced to 
work the first hour).
Ultimately, labor market equilibrium is established through the interaction of 
individuals’ labor supply decisions and firms’ decisions about how much labor to hire 
with the observed wage rate evident at the point of intersection. The firms’ decisions 
about how much labor to hire (labor demand curve) are impacted by their estimate of the 
workers’ MRP while the individuals’ labor supply decisions are affected by said worker’s 
reservation wage.
With an understanding of how supply and demand curves are formed, one can turn to 
the theory of wage determination. The starting point in developing the theory of wages 
is the model of perfect competition, which best illustrates how market forces operating 
through labor demand and supply interact to determine the wage rates and the 
equilibrium level of employment. The five assumptions of the model of perfect 
competition are as follow:
1) firms seek to maximize profits and workers seek to maximize utility
10
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2) workers and firms have perfect information about wages and opportunities
3) workers are identical with respect to skills and productivity; jobs offered by firms 
are identical with respect to working conditions and other nonwage attributes
4) composed of many individual buyers and sellers -  collusion does not exist
5) all jobs open to competition -  complete mobility
If the labor market satisfied all five assumptions of the perfectly competitive model, 
there would be only one wage paid by each firm in the market (the law of one wage: 
interaction between buyers (firm) and sellers (worker) will result in the establishment of 
one going wage rate that is paid by all firms and received by all workers in the long-run 
equilibrium state). Most real-world labor markets, however, feature factors or 
circumstances that prevent the forces of competition and labor mobility from completely 
eliminating all wage differentials, one of the primary factors that of the heterogeneity of 
workers and jobs.
Competitive theory predicts that a single wage rate will prevail in the market for a set 
of homogenous jobs and workers; however it is reasonably certain that occupations differ 
from one another in terms of many characteristics, or job attributes, both positive and 
negative. Adam Smith, in explaining earnings differentials among occupations, 
postulated that people selected an occupation not on wage alone, but on the whole of the 
attributes and choosing the one yielding the highest level of net advantages. For 
equilibrium to occur in the labor market, wage rates would need to be higher in the least 
desirable occupations (more negative job attributes: risk of injury, death...) and lower in 
the most desirable occupations (more positive job attributes: flexible working hours, high
11
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social status...) until the total of advantages and disadvantages were equalized. The 
differences in rates of pay among occupations, thus, would represent compensating wage 
differentials in the sense that they equalize the net attractiveness of each occupation with 
the supply and demand for labor.
An empirical analysis of the compensating wage differential theory can be performed 
within the framework of the hedonic prices model, developed by Sherwin Rosen, one can 
see how wages adjust to compensate workers for differences in job characteristics. A key 
feature of the hedonic model is that it allows for differences in worker preferences, as 
illustrated by their indifference curve, and differences in the firm’s isoprofit curves with 
workers sorting themselves into jobs with different characteristics based on their 
individual preferences regarding those characteristics. It is at the intersection of the 
indifference curve (a factor in the supply of labor) and the isoprofit curve (a factor in the 
demand for labor), achieved through the matching process of workers and jobs that the 
labor market gives rise to a compensating differential and an equilibrium wage rate 
attained.
Applied to the theory of compensating wage differentials, the hedonic wage equation 
is fundamentally a relationship between observed wages, demand side variables (that 
predict MRP) and supply side variables (that predict w j. Since the employer must 
predict productivity before hiring or promotion and the worker can only imperfectly 
anticipate job characteristics, both MRP and w, are subject to uncertainty. Furthermore, 
the researcher can only observe some variables with others playing the role of latent 
variables, captured by the error term in the structural equations and, thus, represented in 
the hedonic wage equation, which is a reduced form equation of the structural equations
12
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with the endogenous variable, wage rate, expressed solely as a function of the exogenous 
variables and stochastic disturbance term. The individual coefficients of the exogenous 
variables reflect supply and demand side effects. The coefficients are nonlinear 
combinations of demand and supply side coefficients.
Although traditional hedonic wage equations typically include noneconomic 
attributes that are certain and observable, education and age, to name but two, reasoning 
suggests that in a model that places emphasis on imperfect information of productivity 
and job characteristics on behalf of the employer and worker, respectively, and 
uncertainty of future income inclusion of a measure of wage risk would be appropriate.
Risk theory holds that a risk averter, by definition, prefers the certain income as 
opposed to a fair bet, that which could theoretically result in a higher expected value, 
while a risk-preferring individual will pay to take on the risk of the bet. Ultimately, the 
risk averter will pass up the opportunity to earn more for the privilege of certainty while 
the risk preferring individual discounts certainty and views the ability to take on the risk 
as a privilege. Generally, an individual chooses a job based upon his/her evaluation of all 
the principal features of the employment, beyond just pecuniary awards alone. In 
addition to the non-pecuniary aspects, intrinsic job factors that which could include 
concerns pertaining to the expected length and security of employment, promotion 
prospects, and the uncertainty of future income, play a critical role in the ultimate 
decision. The job searcher ranks job prospects by their pecuniary and their non- 
pecuniary aspects. If qualified applicants prefer occupation (or industry) A to B because 
<7a < ctb and qualified applicants are risk averse, then wa falls and/or wb rises until the 
markets clear. The situation will be reversed if job applicants are risk lovers.
13
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The hedonic wage equation, as applied to the theory of compensating wage 
differentials, is fundamentally a relationship between wages and the human capital 
characteristics of workers in a particular labor market (Blau and Kahn 2000; Daneshvary 
and Weber 1991; Low and Villegas 2001; Kumar and Coates 1982; McNabb 1989; Smith 
1979; Lucas 1977). Regressing the individual price (wage), against a set of exogenous 
demand and supply employment characteristic variables, the equation serves to measure 
the impact of a variety of the demand-side and supply-side characteristics on the 
observed wage rate and, then, estimate the wage that compensates the individual for those 
characteristics. As this paper serves to measure the impact of a vector of human capital 
characteristics, both observed and unobserved (latent variables within the error term) on 
the observed wage, I use a hedonic wage model.
Under the theory of risk aversion, one would presume that a position that which 
connotes a higher degree of risk would require a risk premium to entice the risk averse 
individual to accept the offer. Accordingly, the inclusion of risk as a non-pecuniary job 
attribute in the model will serve to specify whether the principle of compensating wage 
differentials holds and that a worker will be compensated through higher earnings.
14
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If most people were risk averse, as theory contends, we would expect to find a 
positive correlation between wage earnings and risk. Zero correlation or negative 
correlation would convey risk neutral or risk-preferring behavior, respectively. Since an 
income distribution is typically skewed to the right with the long tail heading in a positive 
direction, we must account for skewness^. I assume that skewness will have a positive 
impact on utility with an individual appreciating the possibility of receiving very high 
earnings, holding risk constant. Omitting skewness from the earnings equation could 
potentially distort the findings and result in an incorrect sign on the risk coefficient.
As opposed to the most recent studies on risk-wage effect, that which used the 
residual as the form of risk measurement, this paper reverts to the mean-variance 
approach with the derivation of risk calculated as the second moment of income. 
Accordingly, risk and skewness are not generated from the error term but are instead 
captured by taking the second and third moments of wage earnings noted in the previous 
year for the individual observations, clustered by both occupation and industry. The fact 
that observations were observed in a previous period is critical and mitigates the risk of 
violating a major assumption of the error term: the requirement that the disturbance term 
and explanatory variables are uncorrelated.
Finally, a proxy for wealth has been included in the model, as the theory of risk 
aversion rests largely on one’s wealth and the utility of said wealth in the presence of 
uncertainty. Exclusion of wealth would potentially result in omitted variable basis, 
presuming that the proxy for wealth was an accurate representation of true wealth of the
 ̂At its most basic level, the distribution or spread of a random variable’s values around the expected value 
is measured by the variance. This is considered the second moment and is a frequently used measure of 
both univariate and multivariate probability distributions. The third moment is used to study the shape of a 
probability distribution, and is known as skewness.
15
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individual. Omitting a relevant variable can result in model specification errors 
ultimately giving rise to misleading conclusions about the statistical significance of the 
estimated parameters. Additionally, if  the omitted variable is correlated with an 
explanatory variable, the problems are further compounded.
To assess the effects of risk, skewness, and wealth on wage earnings for both 
occupations and industries, estimation was carried out using the following hedonic wage 
model:
L î l W i  a O  (X jJC î "L  O .2R 0C C  ^ 3^ i n d  O .4S0CC ^sSind +  £ (
2 » IT; is  the natural 1 og o f  wage and salary income, w h i l e / is a veetor o f  human 
capital characteristics that represent the most frequently cited attributes in the many 
studies on compensating wage differentials and include the following: gender, age, 
education, marital status, hours worked, and weeks worked.
Rocc/Rind^^à Socc/Sind serve as proxies for risk and skewness, respectively, and were 
calculated by taking the standard deviation and skewness for both industries and 
occupations^.
Supported by pure theory and joined in économie observation, the implication of risk 
theory is that individuals are predominantly risk averters. This characteristic is ultimately 
captured in risk aversion measure, or risk premium, so that the risk aversion can not only 
be qualified but also quantified. Although technically derived from industry and 
oceupation statistics as measured by the mean variance approach, the risk and skewness
 ̂The variable, varo, noted in the regression results is the variance of labor earnings in the occupation of 
2002, while vari is the variance of earnings in the industry; people in occupation j and industry k would 
have the same pair of variance (and skewness) measures.
16
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attributes in this hedonic wage equation are treated as proxies for an individual’s 
unobserved risk preference.
Ni represents the proxy"  ̂ for wealth, or non-labor income, and is calculated by 
subtracting an individual’s wage income from household income for each individual 
observation in the data set.
Ei represents the error (disturbance) terms and is a surrogate for all those variables that 
are omitted from the model but that collectively affect Ln W, These variables have been 
omitted for various reasons, that which include the following: unavailability of data; 
intrinsic randomness in human behavior, and the principle of Occam’s razor.
* Note that the American Community Survey does not contain a proxy for one’s home or physical assets, 
that which would clearly serve as a more appropriate measure of wealth.
17
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
I carried out the empirical analysis by using data from the 2003 Ameriean 
Community Survey. The American Community Survey is a comprehensive annual social 
and economic survey, the annualized replacement of the census long-form, and includes 
hundreds of variables for recorded observations.
Although a proxy for wealth was included in the initial regression model, it is 
disregarded in the final model due to data limitations inherent in the model’s wealth 
proxy. The wealth proxy was originally included to test for potential econometric issues 
inherent w ith o mitted v ariable b ias; h owever, a fter r unning t he r egression w ith w ealth 
excluded, it was confirmed that the coefficients on both risk and skewness were not 
affected by the exclusion of wealth in the final model. For visual purposes, the original 
regression (including wealth) and the final regression (excluding wealth) have been 
included and are categorized as Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
The key focus of this study, the effects of risk and skewness on earnings, were 
generated from wage information recorded for the included observations. Four variables 
were calculated and included for both variance and skewness to measure the effects of 
said elements within both an industry and occupation. The regression was run in stages 
(primarily to address wealth proxy concerns previously noted) and originally included
18
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nearly 600,000 observations, prior to imposing certain restrietions on the data set. Post 
regression restrictions, the included observations narrowed to less than 400,000 in total.
19
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Table 1 Table 2
Schooling:
Bachelors 0.486 0.471
(0.021) (0.014)
Masters 0.603 0.599
(0.026) (0.014)
Professional 0.411 0.402
(0.036) (0.016)
Ph.D. 0.605 0.588
(0.037) (0.017)
Marital Status: 
Married 0.059 0.060
(0.005) (0.003)
Divorced 0.045 0.046
(0.006) (0.005)
Widowed -0.012 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009)
Separated 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.106 0.107
(0.003) (0.00192)
Age-squared -0.00173 -0.002
(0.00009) (0.00004)
Age-cubed 8.24e-06 8.07e-06
(2.71e-07) (6.08e-07)
Weeks/Hours 0.042/0.027 0.042/0.027
(0.0002)/(0.0005) (0.00009)7(0.0001)
Female -0.149 -0.159
(0.003) (0.002)
Variance:
Occupation 5.30e-ll 5.27e-ll
(6.94e-12) (7.94e-I3)
Industry 4.63e-Il 4.69e-ll
(3.70e-12) (1.07e-12)
Skewness:
Occupation -0.027 -0.027
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Industry -0.048 -0.050
(0.0005) (0.0008)
Constant 5.17 5.14
(0.037) (0.027)
Wealth -2.64e-06
-(38.27)
0.7216 0.721
Root MSB .67432 .67432
N 381168 381168
NOTE: The dependent variable was the log of wage earnings; 
there were other estimates for schooling but only college level 
reported in this table 
(standard errors are shown in brackets)
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Variance, for both occupation and industry, is statistically significant with expected 
signs that which support the theory that individuals require a risk premium in situations 
of uncertainty. As the variance coefficients represent the squared effect of a $1 change in 
wage earnings (second moment), it is expected that the coefficient would be incredibly 
small. After the appropriate calculation, one concludes that the percentage change in 
wage earnings for a $1000 increase in standard deviation (a $1 million increase (1000^) in 
variance) is .53%, or $110.07. Further calculations result in a variance on industry of 
.469, or $97.40, with occupational variance effects having a greater impact on wage 
earnings than that of industry.
Skewness, representing the notion that workers place greater value on the small 
probability of receiving a high payout as opposed to the alternative, is supported in this 
model through the statistically significant coefficients on skewness, for both industry and 
occupation. The skewness coefficient should be interpreted as units. Wage earnings are 
reduced by the unit change in skew, which for this model corresponds to -0.027 for 
occupation and -0.050 for industry. Skewness, unlike variance has a greater impact for 
industry as opposed to occupation.
The statistically significant, positive coefficients on the human capital characteristics 
of age, education, and effort (hours/weeks) support the theory of compensating wage 
differentials that earnings compensate workers for favorable attributes. Age 
(collectively) supports the notion of income increasing at a decreasing rate until it 
plateaus and then begins to decline. Weeks/hours show that wage earnings increase 4.2% 
for each additional week worked per year and 2.7% for each hour worked per week. 
Education, represented in the table as a unit coefficient, reflects increases to wage
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earnings for a person possessing the degrees so noted as compared to the base state of 1-4 
years of education only. To calculate the effect, one must take the exponent of the 
coefficient and subtract from one (1) to understand the percentage effect. Results in this 
paper show that the presence of a bachelor’s degree increases earning 60%, a masters 
degree 82%, a professional degree 50%, and a Ph.D. 80%, relative to the reference group 
who have no formal education. As the variance/skewness coefficients were calculated by 
occupation andindustry and, furthermore, the 1 argest efleet oftheprofessional degree 
impact is captured in the job one attains (i.e. doctor, lawyer...), there is some multi- 
collinearity effects that which mute the professional degree impact on its own.
Interestingly, only a marital status of widowed has a slightly negative effect on wage 
earnings reducing wages 1.3%. With married and divorced both positive and statistically 
significant, increasing wages 6% and 4.6%, respectively, it is somewhat inconclusive as 
to whether earnings compensate workers for marital status in this study.
Finally, the negative and statistically s ignificant c oefficient on female supports the 
notion that earnings compensate men more than women in this study, with female 
earnings roughly 85% of males.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
Drawing a corollary between the theoretical framework of compensating wage 
differentials and the theory of risk aversion, this paper sought to measure whether or not a 
measure for risk had an effect on observed wage rates in a hedonic wage equation. As 
the theory of risk contends that an individual is risk averse, one would expect that wages 
would compensate the individual for this factor.
The results support the predictions regarding compensating differentials for 
uncertainty as noted by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of variance for 
both occupation and industry. Specifically, a $1000 increase in the standard deviation of 
mean income ($20,767.61 for the regression observations) results in an increase of wage 
earnings for industry and occupation of .53%, or $110.07, or .469%, or $97.40, 
respectively. Furthermore, the measure of skewness adds further validity to the 
prediction that workers place greater value on the small probability of receiving a high 
payout as opposed to the alternative as represented by the negative coefficient for both 
industry and occupation of -0.027 and -0.050, respectively. These results parallel the 
findings of previous studies cited in the Literature Review section, all which reported 
coefficients on risk that ranged from a low of .523% in Hartog et.al. to a high of 1.7% for 
McGoldrick and Robst. Skewness measures were also similar and ranged from a low of -
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
0.003 in Hartog et.al. to a high of -0.887, also in Hartog et.al., as their paper calculated 
risk and skweness measures in three distinct wage equations classified by country, and 
included The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
In conclusion, this study serves to support Adam Smith’s simple and elegant concept, 
conceived over 200 years ago that differences in pecuniary wages are required to 
compensate for the non-pecuniary advantages and disadvantages of different 
employments. Despite the passage of time, the theory remains an established framework 
for the analysis of wage differentials and an important element in understanding labor 
markets today.
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